The Fire and Rescue Service Training Centre

Report to Parliament by the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland (HC 80)

A report published today by John Dowdall CB, the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland, examines the development of the Fire and Rescue Service Training Centre at Boucher Crescent in Belfast. The Fire Authority acquired the premises in 1998 for £2 million, with a budget of £1.9 million for the capital costs of new construction and adaptations to the existing building. Actual development costs to date have been £1.7 million, but the project has not been completed. In March 2005, consultants were appointed to prepare a proposal for the future provision of training facilities and the chosen option will be identified ed by Summer 2007.

Main Findings

  • Re-phasing of the development led to the deferral of two key elements (breathing-apparatus training facilities and a “real-fire” house), despite these being main drivers for the project and key to its success. The changes in the phasing were significant, compromised the project’s ability to deliver its training objectives and impinged on its prospective effectiveness (paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3).
  • Based on the economic appraisal for the Training Centre, the Authority should have delivered 88,215 training days in total over the five-year period from 2000-2001 to 2004-05. However the 74,145 days actually delivered equates to a shortfall in provision of 14,070 (over 15 per cent lower than forecast in the appraisal). Training delivered at Boucher Crescent includes over 6,000 days’ Priority 3 training, none of which was included in the original assessment of need upon which the project was based, so the true shortfall in operational training delivered may be somewhat higher (paragraphs 2.7 to 2.10).
  • The Authority had intended to cease training at its existing, unsuitable, training centre at Westland Road and sell the 1.35 acres that would have been freed up, as a result. However, without retaining this facility, the Authority would have been unable to deliver essential operational training (in particular, Priority 1 breathing-apparatus training), which was originally intended to be undertaken at Boucher Crescent. The Audit Office estimates that the retention of the Westland facility has meant a loss in potential running cost savings amounting to over £68,000 per annum, and over £0.4 million since project inception (paragraph 2.14).
  • In early 2001, a smoke nuisance complaint was made to Belfast City Council by the occupants of neighbouring commercial premises in Boucher Crescent. Consequently, real-fire training is only permitted on Sunday mornings (paragraphs 2.15 and 2.16).
  • The viability of the training centre, already compromised because of the smoke nuisance issue, was further undermined, in April 2002, by a 282 per cent increase in the ground rent, to £240,000. This large increase has reduced significantly the value for money of the project and was the main driver for the Authority’s subsequent decision to seek an alternative site (paragraph 2.18).
  • In the Audit Office’s view, the Authority’s consultants’ identification, at the outset, of potential risks relating to smoke nuisance and ground rent increases represented a clear signal that options and costs should have been re-examined before committing expenditure to the project. Should a similar situation arise in the forthcoming economic appraisal, it is important that the Authority re-appraises comprehensively, rather than proceeding with a potentially flawed option (paragraph 3.12).
  • The architects have been paid fees of approximately £280,000 since 1991 (£146,600 in relation to design and supervision of the construction works at Boucher Crescent and £140,000 in respect of design work and applications during earlier efforts to identify a suitable training centre site). Other specialist companies were paid £0.26 million, including £93,000 to the quantity surveyors. Given the long timespan of the acquisition process, best practice would suggest that there was an obvious need to retender periodically for the work connected with it. However, this was not done (paragraph 3.15).
  • It is clearly important that the identification and evaluation process for future training provision is sufficiently thorough to ensure that the option eventually chosen is capable of satisfying the Authority’s requirements in full. In that regard, the Audit Office welcomes the steps taken thus far to ensure that identification of training needs and delivery options will be comprehensive, with all viable options subject to examination. The involvement on the project team of representatives from both the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (Public Safety and Business Case Units) and the Strategic Investment Board provides the opportunity for external expertise to assist the Authority in its decision-making process (paragraph 3.21).